determining an immediate payoff zt to the individual and the next state xt+l. The probability distribution of the pair (zt, xt+l) is determined by the action dt.
The standard approach in analyzing this problem, which we will call the payoff vector approach, assumes that the individual's choice behavior is representable as follows: He has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U defined on the vector of payoffs (z0, z1, . . ., ZT). Each strategy (which is a contingent plan for choosing actions given states) induces a probability distribution on the vector of payoffs. So the individual's choice of action is that specified by any optimal strategy, any strategy which maximizes the expectation of utility among all strategies (assuming sufficient conditions so that an optimal strategy exists). This paper presents an axiomatic treatment of the dynamic choice problem which is more general than the payoff vector approach, but which still permits tractable analysis. The fundamental difference between our treatment and the payoff vector approach lies in our treatment of the temporal resolution of uncertainty: In our models, uncertainty is "dated" by the time of its resolution, and the individual regards uncertainties resolving at different times as being different. For example, consider a situation in which a fair coin is to be flipped. If it comes up heads, the payoff vector will be (zo, z1) = (5, 10); if it is tails, the vector will be (5, 0). Because z0 = 5 in either case, the coin flip can take place at either time 0 or time 1. It will not matter when the flip occurs to someone who has cardinal utility on the vector of payoffs. But an individual can obey our axioms and prefer either one to the other.
One justification for our approach is the well known "timeless-temporal" or "joint time-risk" feature of some models (usually models which are not "complete"). For example, preferences on income streams which are induced from primitive preferences on consumption streams in general depend upon when the 
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uncertainty concerning future income resolves (see Spence and Zeckhauser [9] ). Our treatment gives a framework within which such effects can be modeled, without overburdening the model with the detail of the primitive preferences. 2 The second (and, we believe, the more important) justification is that the relevance of the time of resolution arises naturally in a dynamic choice setting. Following work on the theory of dynamic choice under certainty, such as Hammond [3] and Peleg and Yaari [6] , we first consider the individual's choice behavior at each distinct time and then we consider how his choice behavior at different times is related. At a single time, the individual chooses from among actions, identified as probability distributions on immediate payoff and next state pairs, and we assume standard axioms which make these choices representable by a cardinal utility function on such pairs. Then a "temporal consistency" axiom is given which knits together these representations: The result is a preference structure in which the time of resolution may be relevant.
This approach, essentially descriptive, is developed in Sections 1, 2, and 3. In Section 1, formal definitions and constructions of dynamic choice problems, states, and actions are given both mathematically and diagrammatically (as decision trees). Axioms and results for choice behavior at a single time are given in Section 2. We rely on standard theories of cardinal utility (especially Fishburn [1] ), so details and proofs are omitted. Section 3 presents the "temporal consistency" axiom and its consequences for representation of choice behavior. Also, the complete representation theorem is illustrated by a simple example.
An alternative approach to preferences in dynamic choice problems, equivalent to that given in Sections 1, 2, and 3, is developed in Section 4. This is a more normative approach which clarifies the issue of temporal resolution of uncertainty and provides an easy comparison with the payoff vector approach. Taken as primitive are the individual's preferences among objects called temporal lotteries, from which choices in dynamic choice problems are derived. This formulation parallels the payoff vector approach, where preferences on lotteries are primitive and dynamic choices are induced. Thus the difference between the two is seen to lie in the definition of a temporal lottery, which formalizes the temporal aspect of uncertainty.
In Section 5, we examine the consequences of assuming that the individual prefers earlier resolution of uncertainty to later or vice versa. Then we show that our approach is equivalent to the payoff vector approach if and only if the individual is indifferent to the time of resolution.
In our treatment, choice behavior at time t is allowed to depend on the payoffs received up to time t (zo, e * *, zt-). The consequences of assuming that time t choices are independent of previous payoffs are discussed in Section 6, and comparisons are made with similar separability assumptions in the payoff vector approach.
2 Briefly, the issue can be illustrated as follows. If in the example the coin flip determines your income for the next two years, you probably prefer to have the coin flipped now, so that you are better able to budget your income for consumption purposes. In later work we will explore the connection between such "induced preferences" and the preference systems analyzed here.
We conclude in Section 7 with some miscellaneous discussion. In particular, relaxation of the "temporal consistency" axiom (in the spirit of Hammond [3] and Peleg and Yaari [6] ) is touched upon.
Work similar to that presented here, concerning preferences for "certainuncertain" pairs, has been done independently by Selden [8] .
To keep mathematical detail to a minimum, standard proofs are often just sketched and sometimes omitted, and the axioms employed (particularly our continuity axiom) are stronger than is strictly necessary (but see Section 7).
Much of the content of this study lies in the definitions of dynamic choice problems and temporal lotteries-objects which allow us to "date" uncertainty by the time of its resolution. The reader is forewarned that the mathematical definitions of these objects are quite complex. The diagrammatic representations (as decision trees and probability trees) which follow the mathematical definitions should be read together with the mathematics.
MATHEMATICAL AND DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION
We assume given a finite integer T (z, x) and (z, x'), and he selects (z, x) (so that (z, x) > , (z, x')). Then the axiom requires that when the payoff history is (y, z), he cannot strictly prefer x' to x. Doing so would make him "inconsistent" in that he would "regret" his earlier choice. Similarly, if at time t + 1 with payoff history (y, z) he weakly prefers x to x', then he cannot at time t strictly prefer (z, x') to (z, x) when the history is y. For in doing so, he is "inconsistent" as he strictly prefers (z, x') although it leads with certainty to an immediate payoff identical to that of (z, x) and a subsequent decision problem which at time t + 1 will not be viewed as better. (An alternative justification for Axiom 3.1, more consistent with the normative approach taken in Section 4, will be given there.)
A consequence of Axiom 3.1 is that every relation > Yt can be reconstructed Conversely, if we have U and ut as described, we can apply the necessity half of Lemma 4 once we show that the derived Uyt are continuous in (zt, xt+i). This is easily done inductively.
Q.E.D. This is our basic representation theorem. Notice that it explicitly involves only U and the functions ur-these serve to define implicitly the functions Uyt. Our machinations concerning the continuity of the ut were required for the necessity half of the theorem, in order to ensure that the Uyt derived from U and the u, are continuous. To aid in understanding this theorem, it is helpful to "solve" a dynamic choice problem. Consider the problem x0 depicted in Figure 1 In order to compare our treatment with the payoff vector approach, it is helpful to recast our treatment in a different but equivalent form. This equivalent form resembles the payoff vector approach in which one takes as primitive the individual's preferences on the space of lotteries of payoff vectors, and from these preferences one induces choices in dynamic choice problems. We define objects called temporal lotteries in which uncertainty is "dated" by the time of its P,(yt), a e [0, 1] and k -t, let (k, a; p, p' ) denote p and p "mixed at time k" (which is in Pk(Yk(Yt))). In this new notation, (a; p, p') is denoted by (0, a; p, p' ). Of course, (t, a; p, p') does not make sense unless both p and p' are in Pt(yt) for some Yt.
For example, two elements of P1 (5) (t, a; p, p")> (t, a; p', p") for all a e (0, 1) and p"e Pt(yt). 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1 follows from the necessity half of Theorem 1. A straightforward argument by backward induction yields the last two statements.
Q.E.D.
The following is the converse to Corollary 1. are the primitive data. One might interpret Axiom 3.1, as saying that the revealed "value" that the individual attaches to the xt is derived from the "prospects" for future payoffs that the x, entail. But we prefer to view Axiom 3.1 as saying only that revealed choice behavior at different times is consistent, without attaching this sort of normative meaning to it.
Comparisons with the payoff vector approach are most easily made by examining our second treatment. The fundamental difference is in the (often implicit) "reduction of compound lotteries" assumption in the payoff vector approach. In many treatments (e.g., Herstein and Milnor [21), the space from which the individual is choosing is the space of lotteries on YT+1, so a compound lottery is identified implicitly by the simple lottery that it reduces to, no matter when its uncertainty resolves. In other treatments (e.g., Raiff a [7] ), this is made explicit (in Raiffa, it is derived from his "Fundamental Observation")-the individual chooses from among compound lotteries but is indifferent between a compound lottery and the simple lottery that it reduces to. But in our treatment, the space of objects being chosen from is the space of temporal lotteries. There is a well defined notion of the time at which uncertainty resolves, and although there is an implicit "reduction of compound lotteries" axiom for uncertainty that resolves at a single time, there is no axiom which says or implies that uncertainties at two different times are equivalent or can be "reduced". Instead, if p and p' are from P,(y,) for some t > 1 and some ye, the individual distinguishes between (t, a; p, p') and (t -1, a; p, p'), saying that the uncertainty resolves one period later in the first than in the second, and he may thereupon prefer one to the other.
PREFERENCES FOR EARLIER OR LATER RESOLUTION OF UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we give the consequences for our representation of assuming that the individual prefers earlier resolution of uncertainty to later or vice versa. Also, we give the additional necessary condition to reduce our treatment to the payoff vector approach-that when uncertainty resolves is unimportant to the individual. ,(zt, d) + (1 -a)U, (zt, d') -Uy,(zt, (a; d, d') The necessity half is a trivial consequence of Theorem 3.
PAYOFF HISTORY INDEPENDENCE
In this section we consider the consequences of assuming that the individual's choices at time t are independent of past payoffs. 
DISCUSSION
The feature that most clearly distinguishes our treatment from previous work is its focus on the temporal aspect of uncertainty. Our approach to dynamic choice problems and temporal lotteries explicitly models uncertainty as "attached" to a certain time. Although reduction of compound uncertainty at a single time is implicit, reduction of uncertainty at several different times is not allowed. Our treatment is no more nor less than an application of standard cardinal utility theory to this expanded conception of a "mixture space". (Note that if attention is restricted to choice problems/temporal lotteries where all uncertainty resolves at t = 0, there is a single "mixing" of prizes and one gets the payoff vector approach.)
It is this temporal character of uncertainty which has led to our results and not "temporal inconsistency" (in the sense of Hammond [31 or Peleg and Yaari [6] ). This is clear from Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, where we show that our axioms are equivalent to the supposition of a single (perforce consistent) preference relation, albeit on the larger domain of temporal lotteries. It is possible, however, to give analyses of "inconsistent choice behavior" in the spirit of the cited papers, by relaxing Axiom 3.1. (Equivalently, one can posit for each t and yt preference relations Yt on De which are not consistent and legislate, in place of equation (5), "naive" or "sophisticated" choice behavior. In either approach, the troublesome issue of "ties" for sophisticated choice comes up exactly as in the analyses of inconsistent choice behavior under certainty.)
We conclude with two technical points. 
